Employee Compensation Act

If personal injury is caused to a *[employee] by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, his employer shall be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter: Provided that the employer shall not be so liable -- (a) in respect of any injury which does not result in the total or partial disablement of the *[employee] for a period exceeding three days; (b) in respect of any injury, not resulting in death or permanent total disablement caused by an accident which is directly attributable to— (i) the *[employee] having been at the time thereof under the influence of drink or drugs, or (ii) the wilful disobedience of the *[employee] to an order expressly given, or to a rule expressly framed, for the purpose of securing the safety of *[employees], or (iii) the wilful removal or disregard by the *[employee] of any safety guard or other device which he knew to have been provided for the purpose of securing the safety of *[employee], (c) Omitted by Act 5 of 1929.

The term “arising during the course and out of employment” is prescribed under Section 3 of the Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923, prima facie indicates the employer’s liability when the workman’s employment is the proximate cause of his injury. It won’t be a predicament to detect whether the injury occurred while the workman is discharging his duty in the working hour.

Andhra Pradesh High Court in Ravuri Kotayya v. Dasari Nagavardhanamma laid down test to identify injury arising out of employment:

1.   Workman must be employed or discharging his duty midst time of accident, 

2.  Personal injury must have occurred at or about the place of employment where he mandatorily was required to be present to discharge his duty.

3.  The immediate act resulting in the injury must establish a proximate nexus with the employment.

Doctrine of "notional extension" of the employeer's premises

Furthermore, in Supreme Court in Saurasthra Salt Manufacturing Co. V Bai Valu Raja and other – AIR 1958 SUPREME COURT 881 has observed and held as follows - 

7. As a rule, the employment of a workman does not commence until he has reached the place of employment and does not continue when he has left the place of employment, the journey to and from the place and from the place of employment being excluded. It is now well- settles, however, that this is subject to the theory of notional extension of the employer’s premises so as to include an area which the workman passes and repasses in going to and in leaving the actual place of work. There may be some reasonable extension in both time and place and a workman may be regarded as in the course of his employment event though he had not reached or had left his employer’s premises.

8. ..It is well settled that when a workman is on a public road or a public transport he is there as any other member of the public and is not there in the course of his employment unless the very nature of his employment makes it necessary for him to be there. A workman is not in the course of his employment from the moment he leaves his home and is on his way to his work. He certainly is in the course of his employment if he reached the place of work or a point or an area which comes within the theory of notional extension, outside of which the employers is not liable to pay compensation for any accident happening to him.

If any question arises in any proceedings under this Act as to the liability of any person to pay compensation (including any question as to whether a person injured is or is not a workman) or as to the amount or duration of compensation (including any question as to the nature or extent of disablement), the question shall, in default of agreement, be settled by a Commissioner].